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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 92-0086-CA

HAROLD BECKSTEAD,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990), confers
jurisdiction upon this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Should this Court correct the trial court's error of

denying Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on the grounds of
pretext stop?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to deference
and are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah App. 1989).

1

This Court should accord the trial court no deference and
review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness*
State v. Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1992) (citing State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Palmer, 803
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991)) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This brief adopts and concurs in appellant's statement of
the case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Officer Wasden was the only witness testifying at the Jury
Trial of Mr. Beckstead.

Officer Wasden's testimony is included

in the transcript ("T") that is prepared and attached to the
appellant brief as Appendix 2.

At 11:30 p.m., Officer Wasden

noticed Mr. Beckstead driving south down State Street and through
the 300 South intersection.

(T. 11). Mr. Beckstead was driving

in the far right line which was very wide because it incorporated
the metered parking spaces and the bus stops.

(T. 12-13).

Because it was 11:30 p.m., there were no cars parked in the
metered parking spaces or the bus stops in the far right lane.
2

(T. 12). Mr. Beckstead followed the curb line instead of the
left hand side of the lane when he drove down State Street.
12).

(T.

Because the curb cuts out into the lane to distinguish bus

stops and parking spaces, Mr. Beckstead sometimes wove to his
left to avoid the curb.

(T. 12). Mr. Beckstead wove only a

couple of feet to avoid the curb and always stayed within his own
lane.

(T. 13). Officer Wasden testified that he would not issue

a violation for Mr. Beckstead's type of weaving.

(T. 13).

However, Officer Wasden suspected that Mr. Beckstead might be
intoxicated.

(T. 13). Officer Wasden stopped Mr. Beckstead,

even though Mr. Beckstead did not violate any traffic laws.

(T.

13) . Mr. Beckstead immediately pulled over and cooperated with
Officer Wasden.

(T. 14). Officer Wasden did not notice anything

exceptional about Mr. Beckstead's actions or behavior.

(T. 14).

While Officer Wasden talked to Mr. Beckstead, he thought that Mr.
Beckstead's speech was not a normal speech pattern—clear but
slightly slurred.
(T.

(T. 17)

Officer Wasden also smelled alcohol.

) . On the basis of the smell of alcohol, Officer Wasden

conducted a sobriety test and arrested Mr. Beckstead for driving
while under the influence of alcohol.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on
the grounds of pretext stop.

Even though factual findings must

be reviewed as clearly erroneous, the trial court's legal conclusion to deny Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss is a reviewable
under a correction of error standard.

Because Mr. Beckstead

never violated a traffic law, Officer Wasden's stop was a pretext
stop.

The trial court was clearly erroneous to find that Officer

Wasden's suspicion that Mr. Beckstead was driving under the
influence of alcohol was a reasonable suspicion of a traffic
offense.

Even if this Court finds that the trial court was not

clearly erroneous, this Court should reverse the trial court's
denial of Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss.

The trial court

failed to apply the reasonable officer test.

Because a reasonab-

le officer would not have stopped Mr. Beckstead, Officer Wasden's
stop was a pretext stop.

Therefore, this Court should

either

grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on the grounds of pretext
stop or remand to the trial court for further factual determinations.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OP MR.
BECKSTEAD'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL ON GROUNDS OF PRETEXT STOP
This Court should reverse the trial court and grant Mr.

Beckstead's motion to dismiss.

The trial court neither followed

nor applied the pretext stop framework this Court clearly laid
out in Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45, 46.

In Lopez, the of-

ficer suspected that the defendant did not have a valid driver's
license.

The officer stopped the defendant because of turning

without signaling.

The defendant failed to produce a driver's

license and was arrested.

The trial court ruled that the of-

ficer's stop was a pretext stop.

Because there was an actual

traffic violation, this Court reversed the trial court and ruled
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a valid stop of the
defendant.

Id. at 46.

In deciding Lopez, this Court laid out

the following pretext stop framework:
A*
If there was no traffic violation or reasonable
suspicion that one occurred, then the stop was a
pretext stop.
B.

The state must establish that a traffic violation
occurred in the officer's presence or that the officer
had probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe
that a traffic violation had occurred.

5

C.

If the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe
that a traffic violation occurred, then the defendant
must submit evidence that the stop was a pretext stop.

D.

Once the defendant submits evidence of the pretext
stop, the state must show that a reasonable officer
would have made the stop absent the alleged illegal
motivation.

Id. at 45, 46 (citing State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979-80 (Utah
1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir.
1986); New Mexico v. Mann, 712 P.2d 6, 10 (NM.App. 1985) cert.
denied, 713 P.2d 556 (1986)).

The City's argument and the trial

court's ruling fail to properly apply the above framework.

The

following analysis will examine each step of the pretext stop
framework to the facts of Mr. Beckstead's case.
A.

Because Mr. Beckstead Did Not Commit Any Traffic
Violation, Officer Wasden's Stop of Mr. Beckstead Was a
Pretext Stop

As presented in Mr. Beckstead's appellant brief, Officer
Wasden's stop of Mr. Beckstead was a pretext stop because Mr.
Beckstead did not violate any traffic law.

When an officer stops

a vehicle that has not violated any traffic law, the stop is
unconstitutional.

Id., at 43. According to Officer Wasden, he

did not notice Mr. Beckstead violate any traffic violation and
did not stop him for any traffic violation.
6

(T. 13).

B.

Officer Wasden#s Stop of Mr. Beckstead on The Mere
Suspicion of a Traffic Violation is Unconstitutional
And Against Public Policy

The trial court was clearly in error when it ruled that
Officer Wasden had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Beckstead was
driving under the influence of alcohol.

Because the Utah Supreme

Court has stated that reasonable suspicion is a finding of fact,
this court should reverse only if the trial court is clearly
erroneous.

See e.g., State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 n.l

(Utah 1991).

In State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987),

the Utah Supreme Court explained Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a) which established the clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact.

The Supreme Court relied on the following federal

standard to define "clearly erroneous:"
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.
Id. at 193 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

When the City explained the clearly

erroneous standard in their brief, it paraphrased Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971).

The

Supreme Court used Wright & Miller as dictum to clarify the
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actual federal standard.

We urge this Court to recognize and

apply the proper definition of the clearly erroneous standard of
review as expressed in Gypsum.
The trial court was clearly erroneous when it found that
Officer Wasden reasonably suspected that Mr. Beckstead was
driving under the influence of alcohol.

Permitting police to

stop citizens because of driving idiosyncrasies is
unconstitutional and against public policy.

In Lopez, this court

stated that
allowing police officers to stop vehicles for any minor
violation when the officer is pursuing a hunch would
allow officers to seize almost any individual on the
basis of otherwise unconstitutional objectives.
Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43. Mr. Beckstead did not even
commit a minor driving violation.
a minor driving idiosyncrasy.

Officer Wasden stopped him for

Because minor traffic offenses and

inconsistent driving patterns are prevalent in society, police
can follow their hunches or suspicions and randomly pull over
cars in hope of finding further evidence that the driver may be
intoxicated.

Finding Officer Wasden's suspicion as reasonable

would give police unbridled discretion and authority to stop
drivers.

This Court should rule that the trial court was clearly
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erroneous and that Officer Wasden's suspicion w a s unreasonable.
C,

M r , Beckstead Brought Forth Evidence to Support That
Officer W a s d e n ' s Stop Was a Pretext Stop.

M r . Beckstead introduced evidence to support that Officer
Wasden's stop w a s a pretext stop.
not vi0iate

Even though M r , Beckstead did

any traffic offense, officer Wasden suspected that

M r . Beckstead was driving wiii ] e intoxicated.

Despite Officer

Wasden's suspicions, he had no evidence that M r . Beckstead had
been drinking,.

Once Officer Wasden stopped M r . Beckstead, 1 le

searched for a rear;.

i

was :i ntoxicated

, -JZ Wasden i : ecogi :i :i zed tl: lat 1 li:

--> justify his suspicion that Mr. Beckstead

had an irregular speech pattern and smelled alcohol
basi s of the sr : i = ] ] : f a] col 10]

Beckstead

On the
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sobriety test and arrested Mr. Beckstead for driving while
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III
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hopes of tinding evidence to support his hunch that Mr. Beckstead
Becai ise M r .
Beckstead's produced evidence that Officer Wasden stopped h i m as
a prete: :t EJtO}:: • t : > f:ii :i id ev :i de i:ic: e <: »f ai i o f f e n s e , 1 Ir

Beckstead

fulfilled, h i s b u r d e n of p r o o f .
D.

The Trial Court Improperly Denied M r . Beckstead's
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Motion To Dismiss On Grounds of Pretext Stop Because
The City Never Presented Evidence That a Reasonable
Officer Would Stop Mr. Beckstead Under Similar
Circumstances
This Court should reverse the trial court and grant Mr.
Beckstead7s motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop.

The

trial court improperly dismissed Mr. Beckstead's motion to
dismiss on grounds of a pretext stop because the court never
ruled on whether a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr.
Beckstead.

The proper test to determine whether a stop was a

pretext stop is the objective test of whether a reasonable
officer under the same circumstances would have stopped the
defendant.

Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44.

In denying Mr.

Beckstead's motion to dismiss the trial court stated that
Now, I, do not believe normal driving patterns would include
following that curb line through a bus stop and other
parking areas. It seems to me that the normal, prudent way
of driving that street was to stay on the left-hand side
where the lane is and drive straight down. (emphasis added)
(T. 15).
The trial court never applied the objective reasonable officer
test.

Instead, the court relied on its own subjective opinion as

to whether Officer Wasden's stop was a pretext stop.

Because the

trial court never addressed whether a reasonable officer would
have stopped Mr. Beckstead, the trial court improperly applied
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the pretext stop framework and improperly denied Mr. Beckstead's
motion to dismiss.
This Court should apply the Correction of Error standard to
review the trial court's legal conclusion that Officer Wasden's
stop of Mr. Beckstead was not a pretext stop.

The trial court's

denial of Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on grounds of a
pretext stop was a legal conclusion.

See Lopez, 181 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 42. Because Officer Wasden's testimony is the only set
of facts in the case, there are no factual issues left to be
decided by the trial court.

This Court should show no deference

to the trial court and apply a de novo review of Mr. Beckstead's
motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop.
This Court should reverse the trial court and grant Mr.
Beckstead's motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop.

The

issue of whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop must turn on
the objective question of whether a reasonable officer would have
made the stop under the same circumstances absent the illegal
motivation.

Id. at 44 (citing Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Smith,

799 F.2d at 740-11).

This Court should consider Officer Wasden's

testimony as to why he stopped Mr. Beckstead and whether such a
stop is consistent with his usual practice.
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According to this

Court in Lopez, if the officer admits having never before stopped
a driver for the offense, it tends to show a reasonable officer
would not have made the stop.

Id. at 45. Officer Wasden

testified that he would not give Mr. Beckstead a violation for
driving the way Mr. Beckstead drove.

(T. 13). Because Officer

Wasden would normally not stop and give Mr. Beckstead a
violation, the stop was unreasonable.

Because the stop was

unreasonable, this Court should grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to
dismiss.
However, if this Court feels that further factual
determinations are necessary about Officer Wasden's normal
procedures and the procedures of other officers, this Court
should reverse the trial court and remand for further factual
determinations.

Since Mr. Beckstead established sufficient

evidence to support a pretext stop, the burden should shifted to
the City to show that a reasonable officer would have made the
stop absent the legal motivation.

Id. at 46 (citing Mann, 712

P.2d at 10). The ultimate burden of proof should be on the City
to show that there was no pretext stop.

The City has primary

access to most of the relevant evidence including the officer's
past stop practices and the practices of other officers.
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Id. at

47, 48, n.17 (citing Staheli v. Farmers/ Coop., 655 P.2d 680, 683
(Utah 1982)(burden of proof lies with party most likely to have
access to evidence)).

Because the trial court never addressed

whether a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr. Beckstead,
this court should either grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss
or remand the case for further factual determination.

CONCLUSION
This Court should correct the trial court's error and grant
Mr. Beckstead his motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop.
Since Mr. Beckstead did not violate a traffic offense, Officer
Wasden's stop was a pretext stop.

Even if this Court concurs

that Officer Wasden had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Beckstead
committed a traffic offense, the trial court still did not follow
the pretest stop framework.

The trial court never ruled whether

a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr. Beckstead.

This

Court should grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss because a
reasonable officer would not normally stop Mr. Beckstead for his
driving pattern.

However, if this Court feels that additional

facts are needed to determine whether a reasonable officer would
have stopped Mr. Beckstead, this Court should reverse the trial
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court and remand the case.

On remand, since Mr. Beckstead

introduced evidence about a pretext stop, the City has the burden
of proof that the stop was not a pretext stop.

Respectfully submitted this

P/s

day of ^^/Pkf

, 1992

LARRY^LONG
Lawyer for Defendant//Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Larry Long, hereby certify that eight copies of the
forgoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and that
four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the Salt Lake
City, Prosecutor's office at 451 south 200 east in Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, this <±TCti day of Apa?iir, 1992.
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